ABSTRACT Monitoring systems for malicious behavior increasingly requires aggregating and analyzing data from various sources, such as network flows, host logs, and end-point monitoring platforms. However, there's currently a lack of metrics and methodologies to compute the observability and efficiency of a security monitoring strategy. This manuscript introduces TOMATO (Threat Observability & Monitoring Assessment Tool), which is a platform to evaluate the effectiveness of a security monitoring strategy by exploring both the number of known adversarial techniques that can be detected within a network, along with evaluating the number of false-positives produced by the monitoring strategy. The output produces both an observability score and efficiency score of a set of deployed monitoring techniques, which are evaluated based on the data from the environment, and simulated attacks generated from MITRE ATT&CK. The proposed approach is then integrated into an ELK stack and evaluated on real SCADA devices within the WSU Smart City Testbed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber monitoring is an increasingly critical task with growing network complexity and attack surfaces. However, despite significant work in the area of intrusion detection, most works have been focused on evaluating how various algorithms perform against datasets with known malicious and normal traffic or system events [1] . However, the performance of an attack detection algorithm or approach is dependent on the deployment of sensors, the availability of their data, and how well that data correlates to various attack tactics and techniques. While many security standards [2] , [3] require security monitoring, it is typically unclear whether or not a specific monitoring strategy sufficiently supports these monitoring requirements in terms of either the accurate detection of threats or the prevention of extraneous workloads during the monitoring the security data. Unfortunately, there remains insufficient work identifying the structured deployments of security monitoring sensors to evaluate whether a particular strategy is sufficient to identify potential attack vectors.
A variety of monitoring sensors are currently available for detecting attacks at the communication and the host levels.
Network communication monitoring includes sensors which
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gather network metadata (e.g., Netflows), tools that provide detailed network session and deep-packet monitoring (e.g., Bro), or signature-based analysis (e.g., Snort). At the host level, discrete log events are commonly used to provide indicators of attack, where process-level and file system events (e.g., Sysmon) are often used to identify certain types of adversarial techniques. The data obtained by each sensor provides varying amounts of information or events, but provide poorly quantified benefits towards the detection of threats. Furthermore, many intrusion detection approaches are vulnerable to a base-rate fallacy due to the large number of normal events and small number of actual attacks [4] .
Therefore, methods are needed to justify the (i) completeness and effectiveness of sensor placement, and (ii) to validate the sensor deployment will not introduce excessive false positives. While it has been traditionally difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the monitoring strategy's effectiveness against real-world attacks, recent efforts to clearly document strategies observed by real-world adversary methods, such as the MITRE ATT&CK [5] , provide a comprehensive taxonomy of known attack techniques based on the analysis of many real-world APTs.
To address this problem, this work defines the notion of cyber observability as the ability to identify a compromised system state based on available security sensors based on two key properties. First, the degree of coverage of the sensors across the network (i.e., ensuring that an attack cannot traverse the network without bypassing available sensors). Second, the available sensors must maintain a limited set of false-positives (i.e., the identification of attack features during normal operations), as such events would limit the value of normal data [6] . Therefore an observable monitoring strategy will ensure the ability to detect attacks without introducing excessive noise.
This paper proposes the Threat Observability & Monitoring Assessment Tool (TOMATO) for evaluating the observability of adversarial behavior on a system given a set of monitoring sensors. The approach begins by combining a graphical system model and attacker behavior to derive the expected behavior of an arbitrary attacker on a specific network, given the known features of tactics and techniques defined by ATT&CK. By combining real system statistics with simulated adversarial behavior, we derive an expectation of attacker traversal over various network paths given structural network properties. Next, this model is combined with monitored system data to estimate the observability of the ATT&CK tactics and techniques executed, given network-derived statistics. Normalized system scores are produced for each host describing the observability of summarized scores over all tactics. Finally, system-level observability scores are produced using Markovian steady-state analysis to measure the network's capacity to detect features of known malicious behavior, and to rank hosts by attack observability. The proposed technique was then evaluated on a model power system network implemented in the Smart City Testbed at WSU to demonstrate results from real-world SCADA software and devices.
The proposed metric could be integrated within security information and event management (SIEM) tools deployed to assess the effectiveness of current technologies and to help evaluate trade-offs in the placement of different monitoring and mitigation strategies. Furthermore, the approach could be used to provide more formal evidence that an organization's security monitoring strategy complies with relevant security requirements and regulations.
II. RELATED WORK
Many previous efforts have focused on the modeling and detection of malicious behavior in networks, with survey papers in several domains [1] , including those tailored to cyber-physical systems [7] . Efforts have also explored the intrusion detection problem specifically within smart grid and control system networks [8] . However, often these techniques cannot be deployed in production systems due to false alarms produced by base-rate fallacies [4] , [9] . This work's direct emphasis on observability is motivated by the need for methods of estimating the prior behavioral distribution of complex systems to measure the observability of, and thus susceptibility to, intrusion.
While intrusion detection remains a popular research domain, less attention has been placed upon the identification of detection sensor placement within a network. Work in [10] explored the use of Bayesian networks to identify sensor placement in a network, while in [11] the authors propose feature selection techniques necessary for IDS [12] . To complement this, researchers have also explored models to analyze and detect the propagation of attacks through a network. Work in [13] explored techniques to detect lateral detection within a network. Additionally, in [14] the authors proposed a technique to model attack propagation through a network. In [15] the authors introduced models to analyze the ability of various log files and algorithms to support the detection of various recent attacks. While work by [16] demonstrates a host-based coverage of known adversarial techniques, but does not expand to a entire network. Furthermore, the authors in [17] proposed an entropy-based metric to detect anomalies in network flows.
The need to aggregate and analyze various data sources has been well researched, including network traffic [18] , [19] , processes/system events [20] , and audit logs [21] . However, the collection of large quantities of data introduces storage and searching challenges, which requires techniques to reduce data quantity and dimensionality, as explored by [22] . Additional techniques have explored methods that enable more effective analysis through stream processing [23] , real-time analysis [24] , time-based causality [25] , improved event correlation [26] , and efficient querying [27] .
A. MONITORING REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS
The importance of system monitoring is documented within various federal government and industry standards. For example, the following list identifies current requirements to implement security monitoring.
• NERC CIP-007-6 -System Security Management, 3.1:
Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code.
• NERC CIP-005-5 -Electronic Security Perimeter(s): While the previously identified security controls requires some mechanisms to detect malicious activity and perform system monitoring, their remains a question regarding what degree of monitoring is sufficient to ensure an adequate ability to detect malicious activity on the network.
B. ADVERSARIAL MODELS
The increasing need to monitor networks and systems for malicious activity, along with the desire to share information on observed attacks has created a need for standardized models of the cyber observables commonly associated with attacks. Industry efforts have explored models for both improving the understanding of attack methods and system modeling. The Kill-Chain model has been introduced as an abstract meta-model formally characterizing the various attack steps necessary to execute an attack [28] . For example, CAPEC identifies various attack patterns that are commonly deployed by attackers [29] , and similarly the ATT&CK framework was introduced to identify the most reliable indicators of sophisticated attacks [5] . Furthermore, work in [30] identified a framework for modeling events from a system monitoring perspective to analyze attacker objectives and capabilities.
MITRE's Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) [5] provides a framework of commonly observed adversarial tactics and techniques based on a review of many advanced persistent threat groups, where tactics represent classes and techniques are their instances. Within ATT&CK, techniques represent specific technical mechanisms an attacker uses to compromise a network (e.g. Pass the Hash, SSH Hijacking, DLL Search Order Hijacking). Techniques are grouped into a one or more tactic classes representing the attack phase for which that technique is commonly observed. Example tactics include Lateral Movement, Privilege Escalation, and Discovery. In addition, Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) [31] provides a mapping of various ATT&CK techniques to analytics. The CAR analytics define the data necessary to detect that technique, along with specific features or code necessary for detection.
The ATT&CK framework permits behavioral threat modeling which, unlike mere signature detection, is capable of generalizing attack-like behaviors to new and unseen instances of attacker behavior within the scope of identified features of attacks or specific APT groups. This work will utilize the ATT&CK framework to explore the set of potential attack sequences that could potentially target a network, while CAR will be used to map the various attacker techniques to specific data sources and features that can be used to detect them.
III. TOMATO
The section introduces TOMATO, a technique to assess the observability of a network's security monitoring capabilities, based on the currently deployed sensors and statistical models of normal system activity collected from these monitoring sources. Fig. 1 provides an overview of the TOMATO approach. TOMATO integrates with a SIEM/data collection tool, that is assumed to aggregate data from sensors/monitoring tools deployed in a network. Based on this integration, it then performs the resulting observability metrics over the security monitoring data collected by this network. While the current version of TOMATO is integrated with the ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana), it could be incorporated in additional SIEM platforms.
The inputs necessary for TOMATO's operation include (i) a graphical system model, (ii) a set of known attack tactics and techniques, (iii) and a real-time dataset. Based on this, the algorithms outputs an observability metric for each host in the environment to help understand both the effectiveness of the sensors deployed within the network and the overall observability of one's cyber data. Based on this, Section IV discusses the inputs to TOMATO and the statistical models derived. Section V details the algorithms implemented by TOMATO and the resulting observability metrics. Finally, Section VI provides a case study on a SCADA testbed that implements real-world power grid controllers and software.
IV. SYSTEM MONITORING MODEL

TOMATO requires a graphical network model
, where H is the set of hosts and L is the set of communication links, as well as monitoring data by which to estimate system behavior. There are a variety of security sensors deployed for monitoring network communications and host-level systems properties which are defined as a mapping O : H (G System ) → T , assigning a set of potential monitoring techniques T = (Netflows, SystemLogs, and ProcessMonitoring) to each network node (H ). This mapping therefore represents the total monitoring coverage of the network.
A. MONITORING TECHNIQUES
While each monitoring technique provides insight into only a limited set of potential attacker techniques, the following section will identify how data is collected per technique.
1) NETFLOWS
Network monitoring is implemented by gathering both netflow records and packet payloads. To acquire netflow records, a switch or router is configured to record network flow records (e.g., Cisco NetFlow, IPFIX) including at least the following set of records: (i) timestamp, (ii) source IP, (iii) destination IP, (iv) source port number, (v) destination port number, (vi) protocol, and (vii) the size of the session (i.e. kB). A unique flow record is produced for every new communication observed on the network. While flow records provide insight into host-to-host network behavior, they provide little information about underlying data payloads except what can be inferred from flow record features.
2) SYSTEM EVENT LOGS
In addition to the network events, system events can also be recorded to provide attack indicators. For example, most operating systems and applications provide some degree of audit monitoring of events, such as Syslog in Unix-based OS and Windows Event Viewer. These commonly identify security related OS or application events, such as authentication failures and successes, changes to system settings, the execution state of system services or edits to certain system configurations. While system maintain a wide array of security events, this paper will only focus on a small number of events that are known indicators of malicious system activity, and new process creation.
Each of the previously defined monitoring techniques can only be used to identify a limited set of potential observables. Therefore, being able to monitor all potential attacker techniques requires that a variety of monitoring techniques be deployed. Further, TOMATO requires that all data is aggregated by a single server that can then develop statistical models regarding system activity.
B. DATA MODELING
These data sources allow us to derive a dataset, D system , describing the global distribution of behavior for G system , consisting of host-level events and relational host-to-host communication patterns. Whereas many applications of machine learning and data analysis deal with low dimensional data, the high dimensional, relational properties of graphical domains make them irreducible to many traditional methods. Additionally, cyber data has a temporal dimension which can also greatly increase complexity.
Host-level behavior consists of system events such as Winlog event IDs and process information, whereas relational patterns consist of distributions such as flow, port, or protocol frequencies between hosts. Before assigning specific features to D system , this gives defined as a graphical multiset of distributions over both node (host) event tuples (h i , e, t) and relational (inter-host) events (h i , h j , e, t), where h ∈ H are hosts, e is some structured event object (a netflow record, packet payload, IDS event, or other monitoring object) and t is a timestamp. The tuple e is defined uniquely depending on the type of monitoring data, whose types for e are described below:
• Netflow: e = (src, dst, sport, dport, prot, size)
For Sysmon, event IDs are associated with different dimensionality in associated event data. Event ID 3 (network connection) would have similar features to the netflow data, while process creation, process termination, and file creation events would have different features. This paper will focus on process creation Sysmon events (τ = PC), with a reduced feature set of data = (img, pimg, cmdline).
C. ATT&CK TECHNIQUE MAPPING
To identify whether the various monitoring techniques can adequately detect attacker techniques, we define a mapping for each technique defined within ATT&CK to the various monitoring mechanisms based on whether the mechanisms can identify that technique. For each of the identified monitoring techniques we explore what potential features provided by each sensor can be used to identify the technique. While ATT&CK includes a large number of tactics, we focus on a simplified set that is imperative to attack propagation, specifically Discovery, Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement, Execution. Future work will attempt to fully expand the approach to all attacker tactics. Tables 9, 10 , and 11 provide a mapping of the various monitoring sources to the attack techniques defined within the ATT&CK Framework. Specifically, they identify ATT&CK techniques associated with the Discovery, Lateral Movement, Execution, and Privilege Escalation tactics. For each technique, event features from various monitoring data sources (Netflow, Windows logs, and Sysmon) are listed. Each element in the table details which event features collected by that monitoring source that would enable the detection of the associated technique.
1) NETFLOW
While Netflow records have a number of available features, the destination (dport) port of a connection is primarily used across many of the techniques because many attacker techniques specifically target systems services (e.g., RDP, VOLUME 7, 2019 SSH, Web). Therefore, for any techniques with the dport specified, a netflow record identified with that destination port number should be classified as a potential occurrence of that technique.
2) EVENT LOGS
In addition to network indicators, system logs could also be used to detect a variety of attacker tactics. Within a Windows hosts, examples of techniques with defined log events include SMB/DCOM connections and Windows authentication events. For Windows event logs, the log id used to classify whether the log event corresponds to the technique.
3) SYSMON LOGS
Sysmon can detect a number of events related to a process including when it is created, opens a file, creates a network connection, loads a DLL, or terminates. In the interest of simplicity, we will focus on process create events, for which 3 features are most useful. These are img, which is the full path to the executable; cmdline, a string containing the name of the executable together with all command line arguments; and pimg, which is the image of the process' parent. We present each technique together with one of these three features (with the path to the process image truncated) for processes that might be used in executing these techniques.
It is important to note that the provided table of Sysmon features is not comprehensive, so that it may be generalized for machines not in our test environment, and to keep the table short enough to fit within the paper. Many attack techniques can be detected by focusing on anomalous behavior (that is, where processes differ from normal), and the definition of what qualifies as ''anomalous'' can vary between machines. In a production environment, it would make sense to tailor the Sysmon rules around what is considered normal behavior for each machine. Nevertheless, certain actions commonly considered anomalous are included within the table, such as instances of Microsoft Word or Excel spawning subprocesses, as the use of macros embedded within office documents is a common attack vector.
D. STATISTICAL SYSTEM MODEL
A popular traditional solution to model such discrete-event domains is through Bayesian networks, conditional probability models in which the relational properties of high-dimensional data can be engineered for a specific domain [32] . By manually structuring relevant feature dependencies, and omitting irrelevant features that only increase complexity, such models provide compact descriptions of real systems and their causal interactions.
To that end, we implemented a probabilistic model of D system via a simple factorized conditional probability distribution over hosts and network links for a variety of cyber event, based on the previously defined ATT&CK mappings. For our purposes, P cpd , represented by an h × h × t tensor, provides a model for evaluating the local probability of MITRE ATT&CK tactic features at every host (node) and connection (edge) in the network based on regular system data, where each value P cpd [h i , h j , k] is defined as either:
• 0 if no data exists for (h i , h j ) on tactic k • 1 − p otherwise, where p is the conditional probability of encountering the features of tactic k, which are the union of the features of each technique in tactic k.
Thus, a high value implies that while we have the ability to observe tactic k for the host pair (h i , h j ), we have encountered few of such tactics empirically in normal data, suggesting that observability is high. A low value implies we either cannot observe such a tactic due to a lack of a sensor, or that the amount of false positives using that metric are so high that an attack could not be distinguished from ordinary data. In effect, this score represents a probability that we would be able to observe such a tactic on the given hosts.
A representation of the P cpd matrix is depicted in Fig. 2 . Here, the diagonal h i = h j elements of P cpd represent on-host tactics, such as privilege escalation or execution, whereas off-diagonal h i = h j elements represent relational tactics involving two hosts, such as lateral movement or network discovery. The conditional probability is then computed uniquely based on the various techniques (Section IV-C) and each data sources, as defined by the following equations.
• Netflow:
For Sysmon, a purely host-based monitoring system, a different probabilistic model is necessary. There are no links between hosts to be concerned with, only the events captured by the host, and the events that are associated with a given attack technique. For each host h ∈ H in which Sysmon data is captured, a probability distribution P h can be formed consisting of the probabilities that one of the features of a given attack technique will be present in D system . Any given probability can be evaluated by fixing the values of observed nodes to query other nodes of interest. For example, the probability of host A and B communicating via port 22 (ssh) can be calculated efficiently by retrieving the distribution over port numbers for the directed pair (A → B) and returning the discrete probability #(port = 22)/ i∈ports #(port = i). Such simple categorical distributions were sufficient for this work, but are open to extension for greater precision and stability. For example, it might not be appropriate to normalize port usage probabilities by the sum over all port's frequency between two machines since ports often bear little relationship with one another, only how frequently they are used.
V. TACTIC COVERAGE ANALYSIS
While Section IV explored a probabilistic model to correlated the coverage and frequency of normal system within the context of various hosts and the available monitoring data sources, these metrics cannot sufficiently analyze the coverage analysis due to structural properties in the network and the multi-staged natures of attacks. To incorporate these factors we explore the generation of attack sequences using Markovian analysis.
This approach, shown in Algorithm 1, begins by generating a set of attack sequences (att_seq), and then utilizes to produce a statistical frequency model (F tactic ) representing the relative likelihood of an technique targeting some system. These frequencies are then combined with the observed probability of attacker techniques in normal data (P cpd ), to produce an observability score (E obsrv ) reflecting the network structure.
Algorithm 1 Markovian ATT&CK Observability Estimation
F tactic ← buildFrequencyMatrix(att_seq) 4 :
return E obsrv 6: end procedure
A. ATTACK SEQUENCE GENERATION
This section proposes an algorithm for generating attack sequences to model potential attacker behavior on a network. Ideally, attacker behavior would be modeled empirically, however sophisticated attacks are not observed at a sufficient rate to estimate this distribution. We instead defined all transitions on the model depicted in Fig. 3 as uniformly distributed over valid transitions, which is a valid maximum-entropy model of attacker behavior in the absence of empirical estimates.
To generate a set of attack sequences (att_seq), we assume an attacker will start from an external system (ext) then utilize various tactics until they gain access to a set of target systems (TS) necessary to their final objective. The attack sequence consists of the set of systems targeted in each attack phase, along with the tactic and technique deployed in the phase based on the ATT&CK framework, forming a sequence of tuples (technique, tactic, host, step). The model assumes Execution is an absorbing state, concluding the attack and ending the graph walk.
Algorithm 2 defines the approach used to generate the attack sequence from the system graph (G System ) and Markov chain (D Tactic ). The algorithm iteratively selects new tactics until it reaches an ''Execution'' tactic and also has compromised a node in the target_set, which is its final goal. When this happens the attack sequence is concluded. Whenever it selects a ''LateralMovement'' tactic the algorithm transitions to a randomly selected neighbor of the current node's outgoing edges connected to unvisited nodes. By contrast, the ''Discovery'' and ''PrivilegeEscalation'' phases are reflexive and remain on the current node in the attack path. Additionally, the number of ''PrivilegeEscalation'' phases is limited to one on each compromised system to represent moving from unprivileged to privileged (e.g., administrator) account. In this manner, every execution of the algorithm generates a new attack sequence of random targets, tactics, and techniques based on the input graphical model G System . The algorithm is then executed to produce a large set of random sequences necessary to comprehensively evaluate a monitoring strategy for a specific system.
B. STATISTICAL FREQUENCY MATRIX
The next step is to develop a behavioral distribution of regular system events based on the previously defined model, D system , and the statistical models of the attack sequences generated by D tactic . Based on this, we will produce a model F tactic approximating the distribution of attack sequences across the system. As described, D tactic models expected attacker actions, while D system and P cpd provide an empirical probabilistic model for observing specific events. Hidden Markov Models [33] provide a canonical view of these models, where D tactic represents the 'hidden' attacker transition model, and P cpd models the emission probability of features over all {host × tactic} states. The distinction is that the structure and parameters of our underlying state model D tactic are not hidden, since we assume a uniform distribution over possible attacker actions.
Deriving an expectation over adversarial tactics on a system entails generating many attack sequences from D tactic and replaying these on a system model G system to track tactic frequencies. This gives an h×h×t tensor F tactic , whose entries (h i , h j , t k ) represent the frequency of tactic t k from host h i to host h j , where h is the number of hosts and t is the number of tactics. The third axis of F tactic simply preserves individual tactic frequencies. Overall, this simulation combines D tactic with actual system properties G system to estimate the complete flow of attack information throughout the network.
For a fully-connected network (every host connected to every host) and uniform random starting points, the tactic expectations derived from this simulation would simply converge to the stationary distribution of D tactic . However,
target_set ← TS 3: curr ← ''ext" 4: att_path, att_seq ← {}
5:
while Tactic ! = Execution do 6: state ← Markov_Update(s) 7: if state == Discovery then 8: tech ← RandTech(''Discovery") 9: end if 10: if s == PrivilegeExecution then 11: if PE==0 then 12: tech ← RandTech(''Privilege Execution") 13 :
end if 15: end if 16: if state == LateralMovement then 17: tech ← RandTech(''LateralMovement") 18 :
avail = avail ∪ adjacent_nodes(curr) 20: avail = avail\att_path 21: curr = random(avail) 22: att_path.append(curr) 23: end if 24: if state == Execution then 25: if att_path − target_set = Null then 26: tech ← RandTech(''Execution") 27: else 28: Next 29: end if 30: end if 31: att_seq.append(target, tech) 32: end while 33: return att_seq 34: end function the system properties of G system impose structural conditions to validate tactic events according to link structure, whether or not a particular tactic is reasonable on a host, and other system knowledge. Hence, G system imposes system-consistency constraints on walk generation, such that the output F tactic approximates the distribution of D tactic conditioned to a specific network. A key contribution of this work is to provide such a method to model the multi-step propagation of attack information throughout a system.
C. SYSTEM OBSERVABILITY METRIC
As the previous section identified models for both attacks and networks, this section explores the design of monitoring coverage analysis methods to determine whether a proposed set of monitoring techniques can adequately detect a network attack. Evaluating whether an attack technique can adequately detect a malicious activity depends on a number of factors, including (i) whether there exists a deployed sensor capable of detecting the event, and (ii) the statistical precision of the sensor to detecting that event given available data. While the former is a simple binary decision, the latter requires statistical analysis to determine the degree to which that sensor results in false-positives. Furthermore, as attacks typically perform a sequence of techniques across a wide array of devices, and while it may not be feasible to assume that any monitoring strategy can detect every technique within an attack sequence, at minimum it should demonstrate the ability to reliably detect a subset of techniques within any possible sequence.
Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of a monitoring strategy, we will evaluate its effectiveness against a set of random attack sequences. The sequences will consist of a set of tactic and techniques defined by the MITRE ATT&CK taxonomy.
An expected value of tactic observability can then be calculated by evaluating e obsrv [i,
for all i, j, and k, giving E obsrv , also of size h×h×t. E obsrv represents the re-weighting of the system-wide tactic model F attack by the local probability of observing behavioral features of tactics in normal data. Another view is that E obsrv provides a model of the worst-case behavior of an attacker attempting to minimize his or her likelihood of detection, e.g., an optimal adversary.
VI. CASE-STUDY
The proposed techniques have been implemented and analyzed in the Smart City Testbed at WSU, which includes a basic SCADA distribution system architecture, as demonstrated in Fig, 4 . This system includes two subsystems, a control center and a substation. The control center includes a distribution management system and a human machine interface (HMI) integrated on one system. The substation includes a gateway device (which aggregates data from the relays) and 8 protection relays. A VPN is used to protect the remote communications and unauthorized external connections. The SCADA server and substation gateway communicate over the DNP3 protocol, while the gateways and relays communicate over IEC 61850 (MMS).
A. MONITORING PLATFORM
In addition to the base system, a variety of security monitoring techniques were integrated into the environment to verify the security of the system. Fig, 4 also documents the various monitoring techniques deployed within the test environment and the systems that they're deployed on.
To collect the data from the various mechanisms, we have develop an security monitoring platform built on the ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana) as demonstrated in Fig. 1 . In this deployment, Logstash is used to collect and ingest the data from the various devices where the data is then indexed by Elasticsearch. Finally Kibana interfaces have been defined to provide visualization and querying of the Elasticsearch indices. 
B. TEST CASE DATA
For the test case, data was collected across all security monitoring data sources identified in Section IV. Netflow data was collected over a course of 344 days for all connections across the relevant hosts. A total of 789 logs matched to a connection between two of the observed hosts, and of these, only 64 matched to an anomaly of some sort. All of the anomalies were related to communication over port 80 from the gateway to one of the relays.
For Sysmon data, 2696 process creation events were collected from the gateway device over a period of 32 days and analyzed for the features of attack techniques. This shorter time period of 32 days is due to decisions to add additional data sources to our analysis later into our research. Of the events logged, only 30 matched any of the observable features. Because of how few these events are, they are listed on the probability of the event occurring given the gateway host) and the anomalous frequency (the probability of an event occurring given the gateway host, AND knowing the event is anomalous).
Windows Event Log data was collected over a much longer period of 336 days for the gateway and 344 days on the HMI. A total of 2183 logs were collected on the gateway, and 3702 on the HMI. Of these, only two types of event IDs were found that matched the features of an attack technique: 4624 (an account was successfully logged in) and 4648 (a logon was attempted using explicit credentials). Event ID 4624 accounts for the vast majority of anomalous events as is depicted in table 2, and should almost always be considered a false positive, although it may be used in correlation with other events to detect some attack techniques.
Using the counts from the Sysmon and Windows Event Log data, we are able to find the counts of each tactic based on its features (which are the union of the features of that tactic's respective techniques). Table 3 provides the probability of detecting each attack tactic using host-based monitoring. Since no attacks were simulated on the testbed, all of these probabilities represent a false positive event. Subtracting these values from 1 yields the diagonal section of P cpd , where both host parameters are the same. Table 4 provides an analysis of the number of logs one can expect to process each day, for each type of log data on each host. This data is broken down into the average number of logs per day (normal or anomalous), the number of anomalous logs per day (those that have the features of one or more attack techniques), and the probability that a given log produced will be perceived as anomalous.
C. ATTACK SEQUENCES F TACTIC
The overall effectiveness of a monitoring strategy will be evaluated against number of randomly generated attack sequences. A set of 1000 sequences was generated based on the algorithm generated in Section V. Of these sequences, there are a total of 4584 techniques, which are distributed as follows:
• Discover: 1451 • Privilege Escalation: 643 • Lateral Movement: 1490 • Execution: 1000
D. EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS
The frequencies described in subsection VI-B are used to calculate an h × h × t matrix P cpd as described in section IV. The values of this matrix represent the likelihood that a given tactic on some host pair would be visible to the available sensors, and not confused with a false positive. The matrix F tactic formed by the attack sequences described in subsection VI-C provides the number of simulated tactics that would be performed on each host pair. The Hadamard product of these two matrices therefore forms an observability metric E obsrv describing the number of simulated attack tactics on each host pair that would be successfully identified.
To demonstrate the ability of E obsrv to measure the effectiveness of monitoring strategies, a number of matrices are constructed for each possible configuration of using Sysmon, Netflow, and Winlog data. From these matrices, a number of aggregate scores are constructed and displayed on the tables that follow. Table 8 represents the sum of the columns of E obsrv , across each tactic, demonstrating the total observability of a host that is selected as a destination for some attack tactic. This provides a sense of how removing a particular sensor will impact observability of each host. In our example, we see that the visibility of the relays completely disappears when Netflow data is removed, and that visibility of the HMI is significantly worsened when Winlog data is removed. The gateway appears to have the best observability regardless of the monitoring strategy, but is significantly improved by the presence of any host-based monitoring. Table 7 represents an aggregated efficiency for each host, for each monitoring strategy used. This is computed by dividing the values in Table 8 by the number of logs contributing to that score. Here the values tell a different story. Although Sysmon and Winlog have the ability to drastically increase the observability of a single host, they provide much less observability per log than Netflow data. This can also be observed in table 6 which demonstrates the efficiency score computed across all of E obsrv , instead of just a column of it.
VII. CONCLUSION
While many previous research efforts have explored platforms and algorithms to improve the ability to detect malicious activity in a network, little work has explored metrics and techniques to compute the overall observability against known adversarial behavior. This paper introduces, TOMATO, which combines statistical models of host and network events with adversarial models, based on MITRE's ATT&CK, to evaluate the observability and efficiency of a monitoring strategy composed of Netflows, Sysmon records, and Windows Event logs. The approach was deployed within a SCADA testbed using real-world devices and analyzed against base-line data collected for over a month, the results demonstrate that while Netflow logs produced the greatest amount of observability per log, they were insufficient on their own, as they could not be used to observe purely on-host tactics. Between the two available host-based monitoring techniques, Windows Event logs appeared to be more efficient, and compared to the increase in observability from adding Windows Event logs to Netflow, the further increase by using all three strategies appears negligible in this SCADA test environment, although the results may likely differ in more traditional IT networks.
Future work should incorporate IDS monitoring (i.e., Bro and Snort), or using other Sysmon features than just process monitoring (such as filesystem monitoring). In addition, case-studies need to be performed on large network infrastructures to explore the broader scalability of the proposed techniques. It may also be necessary to use a refined set of features, as not all of the listed techniques may be as relevant. Furthermore, the tables of observables provided below only represent our best estimates of how those techniques might be detected, and this research could be further improved with an industry consensus on a standard set of observable behavior.
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